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Abstract
This paper defends the thesis that counterfactuals are strict condi-
tionals. Its purpose is to show that there is a coherent view according 
to which counterfactuals are strict conditionals whose antecedent is 
stated elliptically. Section 1 introduces the view. Section 2 outlines a 
reply to the main argument against the thesis that counterfactuals are 
strict conditionals. Section 3 compares the view with a proposal due 
to Åqvist, which may be regarded as its direct predecessor. Section 4 
explains how the view differs from contextualist strict conditional ac-
counts of counterfactuals. Finally, section 5 addresses the thorny issue 
of disjunctive antecedents.
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1 Ellipticism
The line of thought that will be articulated in this paper rests on 
three basic assumptions. The first expresses a widely accepted idea 
about the meaning of counterfactuals. A counterfactual is a sentence 
‘If it were the case that p, then it would be the case that q’, where ‘p’ 
and ‘q’ figure as the antecedent and the consequent. For example, 
the following sentence is a counterfactual:
(1) If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over.
Its canonical formulation is ‘If it were the case that kangaroos have 
no tails, then it would be the case that they topple over’, where ‘Kan-
garoos have no tails’ is the antecedent and ‘They topple over’ is the 
consequent. The widely accepted idea is that the meaning of a coun-
terfactual can be stated in terms of a quantification over possible 
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worlds restricted by a relation of similarity. As Lewis puts it,
‘If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over’ seems to me to 
mean something like this: in any possible state of affairs in which kan-
garoos have no tails, and which resembles our actual state of affairs as 
much as kangaroos having no tails permits it to, the kangaroos topple 
over.1
More generally, if ‘p-world’ stands for a world in which ‘p’ is true, 
and ‘the actual world’ is used non-rigidly as an indexical expression 
that singles out the world of evaluation, the meaning of ‘If it were the 
case that p, then it would be the case that q’ may be stated as follows:
(M) In any p-world which is relevantly similar to the actual world, q.
The class of relevantly similar worlds may be characterized in differ-
ent ways. One option, suggested by Stalnaker, it to say that there is 
a unique p-world most similar to the actual world. Another option, 
suggested by Lewis, is to say that there is a set of p-worlds most 
similar to the actual world. A third option, which will be adopted 
here, is to say that there is a set of p-worlds sufficiently similar to the 
actual world. The difference between ‘most similar’ and ‘sufficiently 
similar’ turns out clear in the case in which ‘p’ is true in the actual 
world. For in that case there is only one world most similar to the ac-
tual world, namely the actual world itself, while there may be more 
than one world sufficiently similar to the actual world. Anyway, this 
difference is not essential for the present purposes. What will be as-
sumed is simply that, on any sensible view of counterfactuals, (M) 
provides a correct analysis of their meaning.2
The second assumption is that counterfactuals are context sensi-
tive, in that they have different truth conditions in different con-
texts. Suppose that the following sentences are used to describe an 
imaginary situation in which Caesar is in command in Korea:
(2) If Caesar had been in command, he would have used the atom 
bomb.
1 Lewis 1973: 1. The idea goes back at least to Leibniz 1985: 146-147.
2 The difference considered can be framed in terms of the principles called 
Centering and Weak Centering, as explained in Arlo-Costa 2007, section 3.3.
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(3) If Caesar had been in command, he would have used catapults.
There is a sense in which (2) is true but (3) is false, and there is a 
sense in which (3) is true but (2) is false: in the first case one has 
in mind a modernized Caesar, while in the second one has in mind 
an unmodernized Caesar. This difference is plausibly described in 
terms of context sensitivity. In one context, we may attach more im-
portance to similarities and differences of one kind, so that (2) turns 
out true, while in another context we may attach more importance 
to similarities and differences of another kind, so that (2) turns out 
false. The same goes for (3). More generally, a context can be defined 
as a set of parameters that includes a world w and a selection function 
f from sentence-world pairs to sets of worlds. For every sentence ‘p’, 
f (p, w) is a set of p-worlds sufficiently similar to w, which means that 
f determines both the weights with which similarities in particular 
respects contribute to overall similarity between worlds and what 
qualifies as a sufficient level of overall similarity. Assuming that the 
meaning of a counterfactual is given by (M), different contexts may 
provide different interpretations of the expression ‘relevantly similar 
to the actual world’ which occurs in (M). This is to say that different 
contexts may determine different class of relevantly similar worlds.
The third assumption concerns logical form. To say that counter-
factuals are strict conditionals is to say that they are sentences of the 
form □(α ⊃ β). In the standard semantics of modal logic, □(α ⊃ β) 
is true in a world w if and only if α ⊃ β is true in every world acces-
sible from w, that is, in every world that satisfies the restriction asso-
ciated with the sort of necessity that □ is intended to capture. What 
will be assumed here is that logical form is a matter of truth condi-
tions: to say that a formula expresses the logical form of a sentence is 
to say that the formula provides a representation of the truth condi-
tions of the sentence that can be employed in a formal explanation of 
its logical properties. The implications of this assumption turn out 
clear if one thinks that, given the second assumption, a principled 
distinction can be drawn between the meaning of a counterfactual 
and its truth conditions. While the meaning of a counterfactual is 
constant, its truth conditions may vary depending on context. So, if 
the formal representation of the counterfactual depends on its truth 
conditions, it must be sensitive to such variation. In other words, the 
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primary sense in which a formula can be said to express the logical 
form of a counterfactual is that in which it represents the counterfac-
tual as it is understood in a given context. Obviously, this assump-
tion is not very orthodox. Most philosophers would be inclined to 
say that a counterfactual has a fixed logical form which is determined 
by its syntactic structure or by its meaning. But the issue of what is 
logical form cannot be addressed here. In what follows it will simply 
be taken for granted that the idea that logical form is a matter of 
truth conditions is interesting enough to deserve consideration.
Given these three assumptions, the thesis that counterfactuals are 
strict conditionals may be phrased as follows: for every counterfac-
tual ‘If it were the case that p, then it would be the case that q’ and 
every context c, there is a formula of the form □(α ⊃ β) which 
represents the truth conditions of the counterfactual as understood 
in c. More precisely, the view that will be considered entails that 
counterfactuals are strict conditionals whose antecedent is stated el-
liptically. On this view, which may be called ellipticism, ‘If it were 
the case that p, then it would be the case that q’, as uttered in c, is 
properly phrased as ‘Necessarily, if p and things are relevantly like in 
the actual world, then q’, where the content of ‘things are relevantly 
like in the actual world’ is determined by c. Therefore, its logical 
form is □(α ⊃ β), where α stands for ‘p and things are relevantly 
like in the actual world’ as understood in c and β stands for ‘q’. In 
other words, α delimitates the set of worlds that the selection func-
tion of c assigns to p relative to the world of c. So the counterfactual 
can be represented as a strict conditional whose antecedent has two 
parts: one is explicit, ‘p’, the other is implicit, ‘things are relevantly 
like in the actual world’.
According to ellipticism, the fact that a counterfactual may have 
different truth conditions in different contexts is representable at the 
formal level. Consider (2), and suppose that c and c′ are two contexts 
which differ in the way explained above. (2) is properly phrased as 
‘Necessarily, if Caesar is in command and things are relevantly like 
in the actual world, then he uses the atom bomb’, where ‘things are 
relevantly like in the actual world’ has different contents in c and c′. 
Therefore, distinct formulas may be assigned to (2) relative to c and 
c′. That is, if (2) is represented as □(α ⊃ β) relative to c, then it may 
be represented as □(γ ⊃ β) relative to c′: α stands for ‘things are 
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relevantly like in the actual world’ as understood in c, while γ stands 
for ‘things are relevantly like in the actual world’ as understood in c′. 
This is consistent with a general principle about formalization that is 
usually taken for granted, namely, that sentences with different truth 
conditions must be represented by distinct formulas, that is, formu-
las that can have different truth values in the same model.
One way to see how the principle applies is to think about the 
difference between a counterfactual ‘If it were the case that p, then it 
would be the case that q’ and an overt strict conditional ‘Necessarily, 
if p then q’. Consider the following sentence:
(4) Necessarily, if kangaroos have no tails, then they topple over.
(1) and (4) have different truth conditions. For (4) means that kan-
garoos topple over in any possible world in which they have no tails. 
So if (1) and (4) were represented by the same formula, the differ-
ence between them would not be captured at the formal level. A 
straightforward way to draw the distinction is to assign different 
formulas to (1) and (4), that is, □(α ⊃ β) and □(γ ⊃ β), where α 
stands for ‘Kangaroos have no tails and things are relevantly like in 
the actual world’ and γ stands simply for ‘Kangaroos have no tails’. 
This method of formalization implies that counterfactuals are covert 
strict conditionals. They differ from overt strict conditionals, whose 
antecedent is stated explicitly.
Note that, since counterfactuals and overt strict conditionals are 
represented by the same kind of formula, there is a clear sense in 
which they have the same logical form. The thesis that counterfactu-
als are strict conditionals, as understood here, is not intended to pro-
vide an analysis of the meaning of counterfactuals in terms of □ and ⊃. Counterfactuals exhibit distinctive semantic features that make 
them differ from other conditionals, and presumably there is no for-
mula in the language of modal logic—□(α ⊃ β) or any other—such 
that having a logical form expressed by that formula is both neces-
sary and sufficient for having those features. Nonetheless, it may be 
claimed that counterfactuals are sentences of the form □(α ⊃ β) in 
virtue of those features.
Ellipticism is essentially a view about the logical form of counter-
factuals. Its main point concerns the formal representation of coun-
terfactuals, rather than the analysis of their meaning. To illustrate 
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this feature of ellipticism, consider the Stalnaker-Lewis view, that 
is, the shared fragment of the theories of counterfactuals defended 
by Stalnaker and Lewis. Ellipticism and the Stalnaker-Lewis view 
converge at the conceptual level, as they both rest on the idea that 
the meaning of a counterfactual is expressed by (M). More precise-
ly, in both cases a counterfactual ‘If it were the case that p, then it 
would be the case that q’ can be evaluated as true or false relative 
to a context defined in the way considered, provided that the selec-
tion function is appropriately specified. The key difference between 
the two views concerns the formal representation of counterfactuals. 
Stalnaker and Lewis think that a special symbol, say >, should be 
employed to capture the meaning of ‘If it were the case that..., then 
it would be the case that...’, hence that a special formal system that 
encompasses that symbol must be tailored to counterfactuals. Ac-
cording to ellipticism, instead, no logical adjustment of that kind is 
required. The only symbols needed are □ and ⊃, with their familar 
semantics.3
2 Counterfactual fallacies
The main argument provided so far against the thesis that counter-
factuals are strict conditionals is due to Stalnaker and Lewis. Accord-
ing to Stalnaker and Lewis, the thesis may appear tenable if one looks 
at a single counterfactual, but it proves inadequate if one reflects on 
sets of counterfactuals and the logical relations they involve. For at 
least three basic inference rules that hold for strict conditionals do 
not hold for counterfactuals, that is, there are at least three distinc-
tive “counterfactual fallacies”. The first is the fallacy of strengthening 
the antecedent. Consider the following argument:
A1 (5) If Otto had come, it would have been a lively party.∴ (6) If Otto and Anna had come, it would have been a lively party.
Imagine that Otto is a very cheerful person, but that he just broke up 
3 In this respect, ellipticism differs from any attempt to define counterfactu-
als in terms of some characteristic modal operator analogous to □, such as Burks 
1951.
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with Anna after six months of endless rows. In such a situation (5) 
may be true even though (6) is false. In other words, (5) is consistent 
with
(7) If Otto and Anna had come, it would have been a dreary party.
Therefore, A1 is invalid. But the following argument form is valid:
S1 □(α ⊃ β)∴ □((α ∧ γ) ⊃ β)
For if β is true in all accessible α-worlds, a fortiori it will be true in all 
accessible α-worlds in which γ is true. So A1 cannot instantiate S1.4
The second is the fallacy of transitivity. Consider the following 
argument:
A2 (8) If Otto had gone to the party, Anna would have gone.
 (9) If Anna had gone to the party, Waldo would have gone.∴ (10) If Otto had gone to the party, Waldo would have gone.
Imagine that Waldo fancies Anna, although he never runs the risk of 
meeting his successful rival Otto. Imagine also that Otto was locked 
up at the time of the party, so that his going to the party is a remote 
possibility, but that Anna almost did go, as she hoped to meet him. 
In such a situation (8) and (9) may be true even though (10) is false. 
Therefore, A2 is invalid. However, the following argument form is 
valid: 
S2 □(α ⊃ β) □(β ⊃ γ)∴ □(α ⊃ γ)
For if all accessible α-worlds are β-worlds and all accessible β-worlds 
are γ-worlds, then all accessible α-worlds are γ-worlds. So A2 can-
not instantiate S2.5
4 Stalnaker 1991: 38, Lewis 1973: 10-13 and 31. The sequence formed by (3) 
and (5) is called a “Sobel sequence”, from Lewis 1973:10 fn.
5 Stalnaker 1991: 38, Lewis 1973: 32-33. Note that S2 entails S1, as it is easily 
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The third is the fallacy of contraposition. Consider the following 
argument:
A3 (11) If Otto had gone to the party, Anna would have gone.∴ (12) If Anna had not gone, Otto would not have gone.
Imagine that Otto wanted to go to the party but stayed away just to 
avoid Anna, while Anna would definitely have gone if Otto had been 
around. In such a situation (11) may be true even though (12) is false. 
Therefore, A3 is invalid. However, the following argument form, 
S3, is valid:
S3 □(α ⊃ β)∴ □(∼ β ⊃∼ α)
For α ⊃ β and ∼ β ⊃∼ α have the same truth value in every acces-
sible world. So A3 cannot instantiate S3.6
The Stalnaker-Lewis argument may be summarized as follows. 
Suppose that counterfactuals are strict conditionals. Then A1-A3 in-
stantiate S1-S3. But A1-A3 are invalid arguments, while S1-S3 are 
valid argument forms. Therefore, counterfactuals are not strict con-
ditionals. Ellipticism provides a reason to reject this argument, as 
it undermines the assumption that if counterfactuals are strict con-
ditionals then A1-A3 instantiate S1-S3. Consider A1. If (5) is rep-
resented as □(α ⊃ β), then α does not stand for ‘Otto has come’ 
but for ‘Otto has come and things are relevantly like in the actual 
world’. So (6) cannot be represented as □((α ∧ γ) ⊃ β). For its 
whole antecedent is ‘Otto and Anna have come and things are rel-
evantly like in the actual world’, in which neither conjunct amounts 
to α. Therefore, the argument form instantiated by A1 is not S1 but 
the following:
S4 □(α ⊃ β)∴ □(γ ⊃ β)
seen if α is replaced with α ∧ β. So the failure of S1 alone suffices to discard S2.
6 Stalnaker 1991: 39, Lewis 1973: 35.
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Consider A2. If (8) is represented as □(α ⊃ β), then (9) cannot be 
represented as □(β ⊃ γ) but rather as □(γ ⊃ δ). Therefore, the 
argument form instantiated by A2 is not S2 but the following:
S5 □(α ⊃ β) □(γ ⊃ δ)∴ □(α ⊃ δ)
Finally, consider A3. If (11) is represented as □(α ⊃ β), the anteced-
ent of the formula that represents (12) cannot be ∼β but a different 
formula γ. Similarly, its consequent cannot be ∼α but a different for-
mula δ that stands for ‘Otto has not gone’. Therefore, the argument 
form instantiated by A3 is not S3 but the following:
S6 □(α ⊃ β)∴ □(γ ⊃ δ)
Since S4-S6 are invalid forms, the invalidity of A1-A3 is easily ex-
plained.
Two final remarks. The first concerns the assumption that A1-
A3 are invalid. The ellipticist reply to the Stalnaker-Lewis argument 
grants this assumption: its point is that, even though A1-A3 are in-
valid, their invalidity is no evidence against the thesis that counter-
factuals are strict conditionals. However, it is important to note that 
here it is not essential to assume that validity is a property of argu-
ments, at least if arguments are understood in the usual way as sets of 
sentences. Perhaps the most plausible thing to say, given the context-
sensitivity of counterfactuals, is that validity is a property of “inter-
preted” arguments, where an interpretation of an argument is an 
assignment of contexts to its sentences. If validity is so understood, 
the assumption to be granted is rather that A1-A3 are invalid in the 
intended interpretation. This by itself does not rule out the possibil-
ity that there are interpretations in which A1-A3 or other structur-
ally similar arguments are valid. For example, Lowe suggests that 
there are non-fallacious cases of transitivity:
Suppose that two people are discussing the influence of upbringing 
and social background upon a person’s political convictions, and one 
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of them, X, takes Margaret Thatcher as an example of someone who, 
though a firm supporter of the capitalist free market economy, might 
have had a quite different attitude towards it. X reasons as follows:[...] 
If Margaret Thatcher had been born and brought up in the Soviet 
Union, she would have had communist sympathies; and if she had had 
communist sympathies, she would have been opposed to the capital-
ist free market economy. So, if she had been born and brought up in 
the Soviet Union, she would have been opposed to the capitalist free 
market economy. X’s reasoning seems unexceptionable to the point of 
appearing almost banal.7
Lowe’s example seems to show that an argument structurally similar 
to A2 can be valid in some interpretation. To see how this case dif-
fers from that of A2, it suffices to think that in this case, unlike in 
that of A2, the possible circumstances that one has in mind when one 
asserts the first premise also sustain the second premise. To put it an-
other way, the possible circumstances that one has in mind when one 
asserts the first premise also justify strenghtening its consequent by 
adding the antecedent of the second premise as a conjunct. The fol-
lowing sentences seems equally assertable in the situation described: 
(13) If Margaret Thatcher had been born and brought up in the 
Soviet Union, she would have had communist sympathies.
(14) If Margaret Thatcher had been born and brought up in the So-
viet Union, she would have had communist sympathies and 
she had been opposed to the capitalist free market economy.
Obviously, this leaves open the question of how a principled distinc-
tion can be drawn between apparently fallacious cases and apparently 
non-fallacious cases. However, all that matters here is that ellipti-
cism is consistent with the possibility that an argument structurally 
similar to A2 is valid in some interpretation, provided that no such 
argument is classified as a case of transitivity. S5 is an invalid argu-
ment form. But an invalid argument form can have valid instances.
The second remark concerns A3, which illustrates the difference 
between ellipticism and the Stalnaker-Lewis view explained in sec-
tion 1. Stalnaker and Lewis claim that contraposition does not hold 
7 Lowe 1990: 80.
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for counterfactuals: A3 is an invalid argument from α > β to ∼β > ∼α. Nonetheless, they maintain that modus tollens is a valid argument 
form. That is, from α > β and ∼β we can infer ∼α. This is why 
Lewis provides a non-orthodox justification of modus tollens that does 
not appeal to contraposition. He says that modus tollens is acceptable 
because from α > β we can infer α ⊃ β, and from the latter we can 
infer ∼β ⊃ ∼α (contraposition does hold for ⊃), so that ∼α follows 
by modus ponens. Even granting Lewis’ justification, however, it is 
hard to resist our inclination to regard contraposition and modus tol-
lens as different expressions of the same principle, and so to think 
that they should either stand or fall together. In a standard deduction 
system of modal logic, this inclination is vindicated by the rule of 
conditional proof: if one can derive β from α and auxiliary premises, 
then one can derive α ⊃ β from the auxiliary premises alone. This 
means that if ∼α follows from ∼β and α ⊃ β, then ∼β ⊃ ∼α follows 
from α ⊃ β. Ellipticism,unlike the Stalnaker-Lewis view, implies no 
separation between contraposition and modus tollens. According to el-
lipticism, both contraposition and modus tollens hold: arguments such 
as A3 simply have little to do with them.8
3 The selection operator view
In the past, some attempts have been made to provide an analysis of 
counterfactuals that employs the expressive resources of modal log-
ic. Ellipticism bears close resemblance to one of them, due to Åqvist. 
According to Åqvist, counterfactuals can formally be represented 
in a modal language that contains an operator ∗ whose semantics is 
given in terms of a selection function f that assigns sets of worlds to 
formulas. That is, ∗α is true in all and only the worlds that belong to 
f(α), where f(α) is understood as the set of α-worlds most similar to 
the actual world. In such a language, the logical form of ‘If it were 
the case that p, then it would be the case that q’ may be expressed as □(∗α ⊃ β), where α stands for ‘p’ and β stands for ‘q’. So it turns 
out that the counterfactual is true if and only β is true in all α-worlds 
8 Stalnaker 1991: 39, Lewis 1973: 36. This section is drawn from Iacona 
2011.
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most similar to the actual world.9
Ellipticism has much in common with this view, which may be 
called the selection operator view. First, the central claim of both views 
is that the logical form of ‘If it were the case that p, then it would be 
the case that q’ is expressed by a strict conditional whose anteced-
ent does not stand for ‘p’ but for a stronger condition that is implicit 
in the counterfactual. Second, both views assume that the implicit 
condition involves a similarity constraint in accordance with (M). 
Third, both views grant that the understanding of the similarity con-
straint may be irreducibly indexical, in that they do not require that 
the implicit condition amounts to a set of sentences whose conjunc-
tion provides a complete characterization of the set of worlds that 
satisfy the constraint.10
The obvious difference between ellipticism and the selection op-
erator view is that ellipticism represents the whole antecedent of ‘If 
it were the case that p, then it would be the case that q’ as α, so it 
requires no special symbol to be added to the language of modal 
logic. Given this difference, it is natural to wonder whether there are 
reasons to think that one of the two views is better than the other. 
One might be tempted to say that the selection operator view is pref-
erable in that a representation that involves the operator ∗ displays a 
relation between the explicit part and the implicit part of the ante-
cedent that a simple formula is unable to capture. But this temptation 
must be resisted. As it will be suggested, ellipticism is preferable in 
another respect, because it provides a neat account of some funda-
mental modal properties of counterfactuals that trouble the selection 
operator view. Therefore, all things considered it is not obvious that 
the selection operator view is better than ellipticism.
The selection operator view comes in at least two versions: one is 
the original version set out by Åqvist, the other is an amended ver-
sion sketched by Lewis. Let us start with the original version. The 
semantics for ∗ provided by Åqvist is rigidly centred on the actual 
world. Every model includes a distinguished world w0, and the func-
tion f is defined in terms of w0: the set that f assigns to each formula 
9 Åqvist 1973: 2-3.
10 In this respect, both ellipticism and the selection operator view differ from 
what Lewis calls “the metalinguistic theory”, see Lewis 1973: 66-67.
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α is understood as the set of α-worlds most similar to w0. However, 
as Lewis has argued, such a semantics is unable to account for the ap-
parent contingency of some counterfactuals. Consider the following: 
(15) If I had looked in my pocket, I would have found a coin.
Since I actually have a coin in my pocket, (15) is true in the actual 
world. But in a world in which my pocket is empty, (15) is false. 
This fact cannot be explained if ∗ is interpreted in the way consid-
ered. Certainly, if α stands for ‘I looked in my pocket’, which is the 
explicit part of the antecedent, then ∗α stands for ‘I looked in my 
pocket and things are relevantly like in w0’, so the actual truth of (15) 
is explained in terms of the truth of □(∗α ⊃ β). But no explanation 
can be provided of the falsity of (15) in a world w1 in which my pocket 
is empty. As Lewis observes, this is a serious limitation. Even if we 
are ultimately interested in the actual world, we must consider the 
truth values of counterfactuals at other worlds to obtain the actual 
truth values of sentences in which counterfactuals are embedded in-
side other counterfactuals. Consider the following:
(16) If I had looked in my pocket, I would have found a coin, but if 
my pocket were empty, it would not be the case that if I had 
looked in my pocket, I would have found a coin.
The actual truth of (16) can be explained only if the semantics makes 
room for the possibility that different sets of worlds are associated to 
the same antecedent.11
The amended version of the selection operator view is intended to 
make room for that possibility. As Lewis has explained, the view can 
be modified in order to account for the contingency of counterfactu-
als such as (15). His suggestion is that f is replaced by a two-argument 
function f ′ that assigns sets of worlds to formula-world pairs, and 
that a three-place truth relation for ∗α is defined as follows: ∗α is 
true in a world w with reference to a world w′ if and only if w belongs 
to f ′(α,w′), that is, if and only if w is one of the α-worlds most similar 
to w′. The three-place truth relation is then generalized to any for-
mula by stipulating that the formula is true in w with reference to w′ 
if and only if it is true in w. So it turns out that □(∗α ⊃ β) is true in 
11 Lewis 1973: 61-62.
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w with reference to w′ if and only if ∗α ⊃ β is true with reference to 
w′ in every world accessible from w, that is, if and only if β is true in 
every world in f ′(α,w′) accessible from w. This way we get that there 
can be two worlds w0 and w1 such that □(∗α ⊃ β) is true in w0 with 
reference to w0, while it is false in w1 with reference to w1.
12
However, some important questions remain open. In the first 
place, it is not entirely clear how to make sense of the assumption 
that the intension of ∗α—the set of worlds in which ∗α is true—
varies as a function of the world of reference. This assumption is 
intended to guarantee that the implicit part of the antecedent of a 
counterfactual can express different conditions relative to different 
worlds. To illustrate, let the meaning of (15) be stated as follows:
(15M) In any world in which I looked in my pocket, and in which 
things are relevantly like in the actual world, I found a coin.
A straightforward way to explain why (15) is true in the actual world 
w0 but false in a world w1 where my pocket is empty is to say that the 
implicit past of its antecedent expresses different conditions relative 
to w0 and to w1. This means that ‘the actual world’ in (15M) refers to 
w0 in the first case and to w1 in the second. That is,
(15w0) Necessarily, if I looked in my pocket and things are rel-
evantly like in w0, then I found a coin.
(15w1) Necessarily, if I looked in my pocket and things are rel-
evantly like in w1, then I found a coin.
The point, however, is that if the antecedent of a counterfactual ex-
presses different conditions relative to different worlds, it is not clear 
why a single formula with variable intension should be used to repre-
sent those conditions. Note that the variation of intension at issue is 
not the familiar variation of intension due to a difference of model, 
but a variation of intension that occurs within a model. Of course, 
any standard semantics for a formal language allows that the same 
formula has different intensions in different models, given that mod-
els are normally understood as interpretations of the language. For 
example, the same formula can be read as ‘Snow is white’ in one case 
12 Lewis 1973: 62-63.
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and as ‘Grass is green’ in another case. But the variation of intension 
involved here is of a different kind, because it implies something like 
saying that the same formula, in the same model, is true in w because 
it means ‘Snow is white’ relative to w and false in w′ because it means 
‘Grass is green’ relative to w′. This is quite an odd thing to say.
In the second place, Lewis does not explain how exactly the 
amended version of the selection operator view accounts for the ac-
tual truth of (16). In (16), two occurrences of the same antecedent 
hide different implicit conditions. The first condition concerns the 
actual world, while the second concerns a world in which my pocket 
is empty. Since both conditions are represented by ∗α, (16) must be 
formalized as a complex sentence in which ∗α occurs twice. Pre-
sumably, the sentence must be such that its truth in w0 with reference 
to w0 depends on the truth of the second occurrence of ∗α having a 
given intension relative to a different word w1. However, the details 
of the account are still missing. Unless a formal semantics is spelled 
out with the due accuracy, it is hard to judge whether the problem 
has been solved.
In the third place, it may rightfully be asked whether the amend-
ed version of the selection operator view substantially preserves the 
thesis that counterfactuals are strict conditionals. If a counterfactual 
is represented by a formula □(∗α ⊃ β) that can be true in a world 
w with reference to w but false in a world w′ with reference to w′, 
then it can be treated as an ordinary contingent sentence. As Lewis 
suggests, if an operator † is so defined that †α is true in w if and only 
if α is true in w with reference to w, we get that the counterfactual 
amounts to a contingent sentence of the form †□(∗α ⊃ β). But a 
sentence of that form, it might be argued, is not a strict conditional. 
Independently of the presence of †, the obvious difference is that a 
sentence of that form can be contingent, while a strict conditional 
must be necessary if it is true. For a strict conditional is a sentence of 
the form □α, and □α entails □□α. Or at least, this holds on the 
assumption that necessity obeys S5 or similar systems.13
From the foregoing considerations it turns out that it is not clear 
13 The operator † is introduced in Lewis 1973: 63. The point that strict con-
ditionals must be necessary if they are true is made in Sider 2010: 200, where it is 
used against the thesis that counterfactuals are strict conditionals.
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how the selection operator view can cope with the issue of contin-
gency. Ellipticism differs in this respect, in that it makes room for 
a distinction that explains how the apparent contingency of some 
counterfactuals squares with the thesis that counterfactuals are strict 
conditionals. According to ellipticism, there is a sense in which a 
counterfactual may be used to say the same thing in different worlds, 
and there is a sense in which it may be used to say different things 
in different worlds. The first is that in which the counterfactual has 
a meaning that does not vary from world to world, the meaning ex-
pressed by (M). The second is that in which the counterfactual has 
different truth conditions in different worlds, given that the refer-
ence of the expression ‘the actual world’ which occurs in (M) varies 
from world to world. Since a context is a set of parameters which 
includes a world, this is to say that the reference of that expression 
may vary from context to context. In the first sense, the counter-
factual may be contingent. In the second, it is necessary if true. For 
example, (15) may be used to say something true relative to w0 and 
something false relative to w1. But what is said relative to w0, that is, 
(15w0), is necessary if true. Similarly, what is said relative to w1, that 
is, (15w1 ), is impossible if false.
The contrast between ellipticism and the selection operator view 
emerges clearly if one considers the three questions raised above. In 
the first place, ellipticism does not need to assume that there are spe-
cial formulas whose intension can vary within a model. In order to ac-
count for the fact that the antecedent of a counterfactual can express 
different conditions relative to different worlds, it is simply assumed 
that different conditions require different formulas. For example, 
(15w0 ) and (15w1 ) are represented as □(α ⊃ β) and □(γ ⊃ β). Since 
‘things are relevantly like in the actual world’ expresses different con-
ditions relative to w0 and w1, different formulas α and γ are used to 
represent those conditions. Therefore, the fact that (15) is true in w0 
but false in w1 can be explained in terms of the platitude that different 
formulas may have different truth values.
In the second place, ellipticism can explain the actual truth of 
(16) in the same way. Since (16) contains two occurrences of ‘I 
looked in my pocket’ which are associated to different sets of worlds, 
these two occurrences are represented by different formulas, say α 
and γ. So the formalization of (16) does not require two occurences 
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of α. More generally, the method of formalization suggested is able 
to account for the semantic variation that affects the implicit part 
of the antecedent of counterfactuals, not only when this variation 
depends on the intended relations of similarity between worlds, 
but also when it depends on the world of utterance. This feature 
may pass unnoticed if one restricts attention to the truth values of 
counterfactuals in the actual world, but it becomes manifest when 
one considers the truth values that counterfactuals have in possible 
worlds different from ours.
In the third place, ellipticism definitely preserves the thesis that 
counterfactuals are strict conditionals. The understanding of the 
thesis suggested implies that strict conditionals are necessary if true. 
We saw that, although a counterfactual may be contingent in one 
sense, it may not in another sense. Since its formal representation 
as a strict conditional concerns the second sense, on the assumption 
that logical form is a matter of truth conditions, it turns out that the 
strict conditional must be necessary if true. Therefore, if a strict 
conditional is true in a world, its necessitation is also true in that 
world, in accordance with the S5 entailment from □α to □□α. 
For example, (15w0 ) is formally represented as □(α ⊃ β), where α stands for ‘I looked in my pocket and things are relevantly like in 
w0’. So □(α ⊃ β) expresses something about w0 that is true in every 
world. This is why □□(α ⊃ β) is also true in w0.
To sum up, the opposing inclinations towards contingency and 
necessity that emerge from the discussion of the selection operator 
view can be explained in terms of the distinction between meaning 
and truth conditions. Of course, one might still object that this dis-
tinction does not suffice, and insist that the intuition of contingency 
implies that the truth conditions of counterfactuals are themselves 
contingent. But nothing can be done to move such unsatisfied objec-
tor. First of all, the intuition of contingency, if there is such a thing, 
can hardly be so definite as to entail that it is not enough to say that 
the same sentence, with the same meaning, can be true in a world 
but false in another world. In the second place, it is reasonable to 
expect that a distinction along the lines suggested is the best that a 
strict conditional analysis can offer with respect to the issue of con-
tingency. For a strict conditional analysis cannot rule out necessity 
altogether. As noted above, it would make little sense to claim that 
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counterfactuals are sentences of the form □(α ⊃ β) but deny that □ 
obeys S5 or similar systems. So the unsatisfied objector must think 
that in principle no strict conditional analysis can work.
4 Contextualism
Although it is generally taken for granted that counterfactuals are 
context sensitive, it is not entirely obvious to what extent they are 
context sensitive. One major point of controversy concerns the role 
of the antecedent in the determination of context. On the one hand, 
anyone agrees that the fact that different sets of worlds can be as-
signed to the same antecedent is correctly described in terms of con-
text sensitivity. For example, it is plausible to say that (2) and (3) are 
true in different contexts, in that they are true relative to different 
ways of delimiting the class of relevantly similar worlds in which 
Caesar was in command. On the other hand, there is no equally 
shared account of the fact that, normally, different sets of worlds are 
assigned to different antecedents. For example, when (5) and (6) are 
evaluated respectively as true and false, the set of worlds that count 
as relevantly similar in the first case, those in which Otto has come 
to the party, differs from the set of worlds that count as relevantly 
similar in the second, those in which Otto and Anna have come to 
the party. The question, however, is whether this difference amounts 
to a difference of context: one option is to say that it does, the other 
is to say that it does not.14
The thesis that counterfactuals are strict conditionals is often as-
sociated with the first option. According to a line of thought that has 
been amply debated in the last few years, counterfactuals are highly 
context sensitive strict conditionals, in that their strictness varies as 
a function of their antecedent. Thus, (5) and (6) are strict condition-
als assessed respectively as true and false in different contexts c and 
c′, that is, they involve different accessibility relations. The intended 
reading of (5) is that every accessiblec world in which Otto has come 
to the party is a world in which the party is lively. The intended read-
ing of (6), instead, is that every accessiblec′ world in which Otto and 
14 This question is explicitly addressed in Brogard and Salerno 2008, and in 
Cross 2011.
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Anna have come to the party is a world in which the party is lively. 
This means that A1 involves a context-shift, and the same goes for 
A2 and A3.15
If a strict conditional analysis of this kind is called contextualism, 
ellipticism differs from contextualism. Ellipticism rests on the as-
sumption that counterfactuals are context sensitive in the less con-
troversial sense, and contemplates no reason to think that they are 
context sensitive in the more controversial sense. As it turns out 
from section 1, a context may be defined in terms of a selection func-
tion. Consider two counterfactuals ‘If it were the case that p, then it 
would be the case that q’ and ‘If it were the case that r, then it would 
be the case that q’, and let c be a context which includes a world w 
and a selection function f. Since ‘p’ and ‘r’ are different sentences, 
f(p,w) may differ from f(r,w). But the context does not change, for f 
is the same function. This turns out clear if the two counterfactuals 
are represented as □(α ⊃ β) and □(γ ⊃ β), where α expresses an 
inclusion condition for f(p,w) and γ expresses an inclusion condition 
for f(r,w). For such representation requires no variation in the acces-
sibility relation: □ expresses unrestricted necessity in both cases. In 
substance, ellipticism is  a non-contextualist strict conditional analy-
sis of counterfactuals. Its mere existence shows that the issue of how 
the context sensitivity of counterfactuals is to be understood must 
not be confused with the question of whether counterfactuals are 
strict conditionals.
Although an examination of the arguments that may be invoked 
to justify contextualism goes beyond the scope of this paper, at least 
one issue deserves attention. Contextualism, just like any strict con-
ditional analysis, must provide a reply to the Stalnaker-Lewis argu-
ment. For that argument questions the thesis that counterfactuals are 
strict conditionals. However, it seems that none of the replies avail-
able to the advocates of contextualism is preferable to that outlined 
in section 2.
15 The supposition that the counterfactuals in a Sobel sequence—hence in 
A1—are strict conditionals that involve different contexts, initially dismissed 
in Lewis 1973, is developed in Von Fintel 2001 and in Gillies 2007. Similarly, 
Warmbrod (1981), Lowe (1990) and Lowe (1995) suggest that arguments such 
as A2 are affected by context-shifts, and Tichý (1984) says the same of arguments 
such as A3.
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The Stalnaker-Lewis argument is a reductio: the thesis that coun-
terfactuals are strict conditionals is taken to entail the absurd con-
sequence that A1-A3 instantiate S1-S3. Therefore, in order to reject 
the argument, it must be contended either that the thesis does not 
have the alleged consequence, or that the alleged consequence is not 
absurd. Perhaps the most natural option for the advocates of contex-
tualism is the second. They might draw inspiration from Kaplan’s 
treatment of arguments containing indexicals, and reply that it is 
wrong to assume that A1-A3 are invalid, for in order to assess A1-
A3, the context must be held fixed. According to Kaplan, an argu-
ment containing indexicals is valid if and only if, for any context, if 
the premises are true in that context, the conclusion must be true 
in that context. For example, ‘She is there, so she is there’ turns out 
valid on Kaplan’s definition, because it can’t be the case that a con-
text makes ‘She is there’ true and false at the same time. A similar 
treatment may be applied to A1-A3: since validity amounts to truth 
preservation in any context, the fact that A1-A3 have true premises 
and false conclusion in the intended interpretation does not show 
that they are invalid, given that their intended interpretation involves 
context-shifts.16
This reply is not entirely satisfactory. If one assumes, follow-
ing Kaplan, that validity is a property of arguments, and claim that 
A1-A3 are valid, despite the fact that their intended interpretation 
involves context-shifts, one has a straightforward account of the re-
lation between A1-A3 and S1-S3: A1-A3 are valid in that they instan-
tiate S1-S3. The obvious drawback of this reply, however, is that it 
clashes with the apparent invalidity of A1-A3 in the intended inter-
pretation. Kaplan’s definition leaves unexplained the fact that A1-A3 
can be used in such a way that their premises are true and their 
conclusion is false, just as it leaves unexplained the fact that ‘She is 
there, so she is there’ can be used in such a way that its premise is 
true and its conclusion is false. If an argument is valid, one may be 
tempted to say, how can it be the case that its premises are true and 
its conclusion false? As it has been argued against Kaplan, a definition 
16  Kaplan’s definition is suggested in Kaplan 1989. A reasoning along the lines 
considered is offered in Lowe 1990 and in Brogaard and Salerno 2008, although it 
is not accompanied by a strict conditional analysis of counterfactuals.
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of validity that holds for arguments containing context sensitive ex-
pressions should take into account non-univocal interpretations of 
their premises and conclusions, that is, interpretations which involve 
context-shifts.17
A different way to question the assumption that A1-A3 are invalid 
is to assume that validity is a property of interpreted arguments, and 
claim that, although A1-A3 are invalid in the intended interpreta-
tion, they are valid in other interpretations, so it is wrong to say that 
they are invalid simpliciter. The advantage of this reply is that it ac-
counts for the apparent invalidity of A1-A3 in the intended interpre-
tation. Its disadvantage, however, is that the relation between A1-A3 
and S1-S3 becomes problematic. On the standard understanding of 
formal validity, an argument form is valid if and only if all its in-
stances are valid. Assuming that validity is a property of interpreted 
arguments, this is to say that an argument form is valid if and only if 
all its instances are valid interpreted arguments. But then it turns out 
that some valid argument forms, S1-S3, have invalid instances, which 
is quite hard to accept.18
What has been said so far shows that it is not clear how the ad-
vocates of contextualism can reject the assumption that A1-A3 are 
invalid. Of course, rejecting that assumption is not the only way to 
deny the absurdity of the alleged consequence that A1-A3 instanti-
ate S1-S3. The other way is to reject the assumption that S1-S3 are 
valid. However, such a reply throws the baby out with the bathwa-
ter. To say that S1-S3 are invalid is to deny the basic principles of 
modal logic. For the validity of S1-S3 follows from those principles. 
If S1-S3 are invalid, then the semantics of the language in which they 
are expressed is not the familiar semantics of modal logic, and □ 
does not have its familiar meaning. Even if one is willing to accept 
this consequence, which is not easy to swallow, the question remains 
of how the thesis that counterfactuals are strict conditionals can be 
maintained in some sense that matters to the Stalnaker-Lewis argu-
ment. For that argument is intended to establish that counterfactuals 
17 This line of argument is developed in different ways in Yagisawa 1993, Ia-
cona 2010, and Georgi 2015.
18 Note that the case of a valid form with invalid instances significantly dif-
fers from the case considered in section 2 of an invalid form with valid instances.
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aren’t strict conditionals just in the familiar sense.
Since the advocates of contextualism can hardly deny the absur-
dity of the alleged consequence of the thesis that counterfactuals are 
strict conditionals, it seems that a better option for them is to deny 
that the thesis has that consequence. As it turns out from section 2, 
this is the kind of reply provided by ellipticism. However, there are 
significant differences at the formal level. If counterfactulas are strict 
conditionals whose strictness varies as a function of their explicit 
antecedent, the obvious way to formally represent their variablity 
is to adopt indexed necessity operators □i, where each i bears some 
relation to the antecedent of the formula in which it occurs. This way 
it can be contended that A1-A3 do not instantiate S1-S3 but invalid 
schemas in which different indices occur. Although there is nothing 
intrinsically wrong with this option, its formal part need be devel-
oped in order to be properly assessed, as it departs to some extent 
from standard modal logic. Ellipticism implies nothing like that, 
since S1-S3 are replaced by invalid schemas in the same language, 
S4-S5. So it seems that the best reply to the Stalnaker-Lewis argu-
ment that the advocates of contextualism can offer is a logically more 
complex variant of the ellipticist reply.
5 Disjunctive antecedents
This last section shows how ellipticism can handle the old problem of 
disjunctive antecedents. The problem concerns the inference schema 
called simplification of disjunctive antecedents, or SDA:
SDA If p or q had been the case, then r would have been the case. ∴ If p had been the case, then r would have been the case.
On the one hand, it may seem that SDA is a valid schema, for there 
are clear cases in which we reason in accordance with it. Consider 
the following sentence:
(17) If either Oswald had not fired or Kennedy had been in a bul-
let-proof car, Kennedy would be alive today.
What (17) conveys is that each of two possible events, Oswald not 
firing and Kennedy being in a bullet-proof car, would have lead to 
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the same result independently of the other, Kennedy being alive to-
day. So it seems that from (17) we can infer
(18) If Oswald had not fired, Kennedy would be alive today.
And the same goes for the other disjunct.19
On the other hand, it has been argued that SDA is invalid, in that 
there are clear counterexamples to it. Suppose someone asks which 
side Spain fought on in World War II, and we reply that Spain did not 
enter the war, then adding the following sentence:
(19) If Spain had fought on the Axis side or on the Allied side, she 
would have fought on the Axis side.
In this case what we definitely are not willing to infer
(20) If Spain had fought on the Allies side, she would have fought 
on the Axis side.20
When uttering (19), we don’t want to say that each of two possible 
events, Spain fighting on the Axis side and Spain fighting on the Al-
lies side, would have lead to the same result independently of the 
other, Spain fighting on the Axis side. Rather, we want to say that if 
the disjunction ‘Spain fought on the Axis side or Spain fought on the 
Allied side’ were true, it would be true in virtue of the first disjunct. 
Therefore, not every counterfactual ‘If p or q had been the case, then 
r would have been the case’ is like (17).
According to the Stalnaker-Lewis view, SDA is invalid. If one 
represents the premise as (α ∨ β) > γ and the conclusion as α > γ, 
one gets an invalid argument form: it may be the case that (α ∨ β) > γ is true, because every relevantly similar β-world is a γ-world, while α > γ is false. The friends of the Stalnaker-Lewis view have provided 
at least two arguments against the validity of SDA. The first goes as 
follows. Inferences such as that from (17) to (18) are indeed plau-
sible. But their plausibility can be explained without assuming that 
SDA is a valid schema. Although it might seem that (17) has the form (α ∨ β) > γ, in reality it has the form (α > γ) ∧ (β > γ), hence (18) 
amounts to one of its conjuncts. The word ‘or’ in (17) is not to be 
19 Fine 1975:453, Nute 1975:775-776, Ellis, Jackson and Pargetter 1977:355.
20 The example comes from McKay and Van Inwagen 1977.
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read in the standard way, as it often happens. Sometimes the surface 
structure of natural language is misleading.21
This argument is not very convincing. It is legitimate to suppose 
that the plausibility of the inference from (17) to (18) can be ex-
plained without assuming that SDA is a valid schema. But the claim 
that (17) has the form (α > γ) ∧ (β > γ) requires an independent 
justification, and it is not clear that such a justification can be pro-
vided. The trouble is not only the weakness of the evidence for that 
claim, but also the strength of the evidence against it. As it has been 
observed, ‘or’ seems to behave in the usual way when negated. Con-
sider the following sentence:
(21) If it had not been the case that either Oswald had not fired or 
Kennedy had been in a bullet-proof car, Kennedy would not 
be alive today.
Prima facie, (21) is equivalent to ‘If it had been the case that Oswald 
had fired and Kennedy had not been in a bullet-proof car, Kennedy 
would not be alive today’. This is exactly what we should expect 
given the standard assumption that ∼(α ∨ β) is equivalent to ∼α ∧ ∼β. Instead, if the logical form of (17) were (α > γ) ∧ (β > γ), its 
logical form would be something like ∼((α > ∼γ) ∧ (β > ∼γ)) or ∼(α > ∼γ)∧ ∼(β > ∼γ), which is quite implausible.22
The second argument is that the assumption that SDA is a valid 
schema, combined with the apparently innocuous principle of substi-
tution of equivalents, leads to undesirable results. Since α is equiva-
lent to (α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ ∼β), by substitution of equivalents we get that α > γ entails ((α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ ∼β)) > γ. But if SDA is a valid schema, 
from ((α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ ∼β)) > γ we get (α ∧ β) > γ. So it turns out 
that α > γ entails (α ∧ β) > γ, which is the unacceptable rule of 
strengthening the antecedent.23
This argument can have some effect only on those who accept 
the formalization suggested by the Stalnaker-Lewis view, hence re-
ject the thesis that counterfactuals are strict conditionals. For if the 
21 Loewer 1976: 534-537, McKay and Van Inwagen 1977: 355, Lewis 1977: 
360-361.
22 See Ellis, Jackson and Pargetter 1977: 356.
23 Fine 1975: 453, Lewis 1977: 359.
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thesis holds, no such trouble can arise. According to a strict condi-
tional analysis, the most natural formal counterpart of SDA is a valid 
argument form:
S7 □((α ∨ β) ⊃ γ)∴ □(α ⊃ γ)
Since every α-world is a α ∨ β-world, if every accessible α ∨ β-world 
is a γ-world, every accessible α-world must be a γ-world. Assuming 
substitution of equivalents, from S7 we get that □(α ⊃ γ) entails □((α ∧ β) ⊃ γ). But there is nothing wrong with that, since S1 is 
valid.
From the two arguments considered emerges no straightforward 
solution to the problem of disjunctive antecedents. It is reasonable 
to say that SDA is not a valid schema, in that not every sentence that 
may occur as a premise of SDA is like (17). Undoubtedly, a distinc-
tion must be drawn between counterfactuals such as (17) and coun-
terfactuals such as (19). But it would be nice to have an explanation 
of this distinction that does not rest on highly debatable assumptions. 
Ellipticism can provide such explanation.
Consider (17). In this case it is said that if each of the disjuncts 
that occur in the antecedent were true, it would make the consequent 
true. Accordingly, (17) is properly phrased as follows: necessarily, if 
Oswald has fired and things are relevantly like in the actual world 
or Kennedy has been in a bullet-proof car and things are relevantly 
like in the actual world, then Kennedy is alive today. So its formal 
representation is □((α ∨ β) ⊃ γ), where α stands for ‘Oswald has 
fired and things are relevantly like in the actual world’, and β stands 
for ‘Kennedy has been in a bullet-proof car and things are relevantly 
like in the actual world’. Since the logical form of (18) is □(α ⊃ γ), 
(17) entails (18) in virtue of S7.
Now consider (19). In this case it is said that if the disjunction 
that forms the antecedent were true, the consequent would make it 
true. Accordingly, (19) is properly phrased as follows: necessarily, if 
Spain fought either on the Axis side or on the Allied side and things 
are relevantly like in the actual world, then Spain fought on the Axis 
side. So its formal representation is □(α ⊃ β), where α stands for 
‘Spain fought either on the Axis side or on the Allied side and things 
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are relevantly like in the actual world’, and β stands for ‘Spain fought 
on the Axis side’. Since the formal representation of (20) is □(γ ⊃ β), where γ stands for ‘Spain fought on the Allies side and things are 
relevantly like in the actual world’, the inference from (19) to (20) 
is not formally valid.
More generally, SDA is ambiguous. There are cases of SDA in 
which the premise is adequately represented as a strict conditional 
with a disjunctive antecedent, and cases of SDA in which the prem-
ise does not have that form. The inferences of the first kind are valid 
because they instantiate S7. Those of the second kind are invalid be-
cause they instantiate an invalid argument form.
This explanation, just like that proposed by the friends of the 
Stalnaker-Lewis view, implies that there is no strict rule for the for-
malization of a sentence ‘If p or q had been the case, then r would 
have been the case’. The recipe adopted so far for counterfactuals 
whose antecedent is a simple sentence or a conjunction works for 
(19) but not for (17). However, the account of (17) suggested entails 
no drastic revision of its apparent structure. This turns out clear if 
we consider the relation between (17) and (21). If (17) is represented 
as □((α ∨ β) ⊃ γ), there is no trouble with the negation of its explic-
it antecedent. (21) can be represented as □(∼(α ∨ β) ⊃ ∼γ), which 
is equivalent to □((∼α ∧ ∼β) ⊃ ∼γ) on the usual understanding of 
‘or’. This means that the logical form of (17) and the logical form of 
(21) turn out to be related exactly in the way one would expect.
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